Four years ago, mobile operators accepted increased competition after the
government agreed to share their business risk. A forward-looking National
Telecom Policy 1999 allocated licenses by services and not by technology. But
the WLL (M) service now available to basic telecom operators can hardly be
distinguished from mobile services.
This has been the cause of rising rift between the GSM and CDMA operators.
The fight reached alarming proportions soon after the soft launch Reliance’s
India Mobile services. In a free-for-all, operators resorted to denial of
interconnect to each other, only to compound the woes of the bewildered
customer.
Role
of the Regulator
According to the International Telecommunication Union’s colloquium on
regulators, interconnect issues arise soon after the initial phase of
deregulation, when newer players have to route traffic through established once
monopolistic incumbents. Since late entrants are usually competitors with newer
technologies and better customer service attitudes they are naturally perceived
as threats. Incumbents therefore seldom cooperate with them. Since the primary
reason for deregulation is to foster competition, the regulator has to step in
ensuring a level playing field.
Consulting firm Gartner Research has a model that describes the
transformation that occurs in deregulated telecom economies. Soon after
deregulation—as it happened in our country during 1994-95—a plethora of
players rushes in, representing an expansionistic phase. As operators’
business models develop, competition, shakeout, and consolidation are witnessed.
Tariffs fall and volumes surge. Finally, there is restructuring amongst a few
players, when economies of scale allow prices to fall further and traffic to
soar almost exponentially. According to Geoff Johnson, research director,
"The number of years after deregulation taken to reach the restructuring
phase depends on the effectiveness of the regulator". The stronger it is,
shorter is the time for a country to reach telecom maturity, usually exhibited
among other things by pure revenue sharing interconnect agreements based on cost
plus operations. If the regulator is weak, this duration gets protracted and
painful as incumbents resist change and try to maintain status quo.
"Interconnection is tougher and longer than expected. But all countries
have to go through this", he points out. The intermediate years are tough
since there are large amounts of revenue, huge traffic changes as well as
personalities involved. A weak regulator unable to help build interconnect
agreements, creates business frustration amongst the newer players who witness
poor or no returns on investment.
| Global
Lessons in Telecom Regulation |
|
In
March 1998, Oftel, the British telecom
regulator called for scrapping all telecom and broadcasting acts. It
said the present system was creaking and there was overlap between
different regulatory bodies creating uncertainty and hampering
investment
In
September 2000, Oftel was accused of
stifling Internet deregulation by giving preferential treatment to
incumbent British Telecom. It later refuted the charges
In
April 2001, faced with an imminent consolidation Germany’s telecom
regulator invited the country’s six 3G mobile operators to build
plans for sharing infrastructure and spectrum
In
February 2002, the Philippines
government asked its regulator to ensure that all four mobile
players gave the same number of free SMS messages to its subscriber
base
In
February 2002, the US trade
representative pointed out that telecom reforms in Mexico, South
Africa, Peru and Japan were lagging
In
March 2002, Hong Kong’s telecom
regulator issued a warning to incumbent operator PCCW-HKT Telephone
after it found the operator lethargic on phone number portability
requests from newer and smaller players
In
May 2002, the Turkish telecom regulator
was unable to bring incumbent and new entrants in mobile services to
an agreement regarding national roaming services. It admitted to
being over optimistic
In November
2002, China’s secretary of the
ministry of information industry, the equivalent of telecom
regulator, was asked to step down. He was perceived to be delaying
telecom reforms for the country’s 199 million mobile and 200 fixed
line subscribers |
|
What Causes Conflict?
The face-off in the first half of January this year, between mobile
operators, the telecom regulator, private basic telecom operators and incumbents
stems from exactly these feelings of business frustration. The root cause again—one-sided
interconnect terms built into revenue sharing agreements between basic and
mobile operators. Right since 1995, when mobile and basic licenses were first
issued, an access charge has existed for a mobile subscriber call terminating in
a basic operator’s and now also a WLL (M) network.
The origin of this access charge lies in the tariff structure of incumbents
BSNL and MTNL, which has been calculated on the basis of cross subsidy. Revenues
from long-distance calls pay for local calls. Revenues from higher usage owners
subsidize the costs of lower usage owners. Working on a below-cost model for
intra-circle traffic, MTNL and BSNL had no option but to recover costs of
interconnecting with mobile operators from the mobile operators themselves,
since it could not differentially increase tariffs for its own subscribers.
Mobile operators have, since 1995, therefore been stuck with both a ‘calling
party pays’ and a ‘receiving party pays’ situation, a peculiar situation
present only in this country.
Things would have continued like that, but for the introduction of WLL (M)
services. Department of Telecom had to create the service as an additional sop
so as to keep the business interests of private basic telecom players alive. S
Ramakrishnan, managing director, Tata Teleservices, says, "Limited mobility
is an additional business opportunity given to make the basic service license
viable." According to him, if this ‘abnormal concession’ had not been
made, only MTNL and BSNL would be around today.
While DoT created WLL (M), TRAI was supposed to implement a suitable
interconnect and revenue sharing arrangement among all concerned operators. The
ITU clearly specifies that the national regulator should help build these
agreements, with minimal involvement. In essence, interconnect terms can also be
brokered among the players themselves.
In the Corner
2001 onwards, after the first WLL (M) networks were rolled out by Tata
Teleservices in Andhra Pradesh, interconnect agreements between private basic
and mobile operators have been almost on an ad hoc basis. While private mobile
operators were transferring the Rs 1.20 access charge to them less their
collection fees, it is believed that private basic telecom operators were also
sharing a nominal access fee with them, especially for calls originating from
their WLL (M) networks. In the case of incumbents BSNL and MTNL, no such
reciprocal sharing was taking place. But the whole arrangement has remained very
fluid and sporadic with TRAI doing little to move towards cost based revenue
sharing agreements. While TRAI did present its reference interconnect offer,
mobile operators dismissed it as a "meaningless piece of document" and
"a menu with no price list".
Moreover, in order to make handover of traffic between operators smooth,
establishing optimal points of interconnection is necessary. This is also a key
role that the regulator has to play, according to ITU guidelines. Again, while
mobile operators have complained to TRAI about incumbents dragging their feet on
this issue, the regulator has done little to get things underway. In a recently
published article, former CMD of MTNL, S Rajagopalan writes, "TRAI does not
appear to be independent and is not discharging its functions well. There is
nobody the private operators can go to for remedy; they can be called silent
sufferers."
In early January this year, as the story goes, TRAI started putting pressure
on mobile operators to give faster access to Tata Teleservices’ WLL-M roll out
in Delhi and elsewhere. "We were in the middle of a commercial dispute and
somebody comes in and says you interconnect first and settle terms later,"
a mobile operator says.
TRAI’s insistence to provide interconnection first and draw up terms later
was in sharp contrast with the practice adopted by the incumbents. Mobile
operators point out that BSNL took almost 12 months to provide them
interconnectivity across the country.
"It has never been an issue to interconnect with WLL, but all we want is
a fair termination charge," a mobile operator points out.
TRAI’s recent announcement is a step in the right direction, but not
necessarily the right step. Kobita Desai, Gartner’s senior telecom analyst in
the country, says, "There is no real logic for an access charge since no
business model can absorb it." The only way forward is therefore complete
elimination of the access charge. Gartner’s recommendation is to progress
towards cost-based, revenue-sharing interconnect agreements, and this can only
be facilitated by the regulator.
Swings Must Be Overcome
Rajagopalan in his article contrasts the old and the new TRAI, which is now
soft towards incumbents as a backlash of its earlier form. What was inevitable
to the earlier TRAI has only been postponed. It is only a matter of time before
market pressures again push the present TRAI, DoT and the incumbents into a more
realistic acceptance of the present business dynamics.
In fact, though forgotten by many, the first real interconnect agreements
were put forward by the previous TRAI as early as 1998-99. These were outright
rejected by DoT since they jeopardized the revenue models of both BSNL and MTNL.
TRAI was then taken to court by MTNL for overstepping its mandate. The
regulatory body was dismantled, and then reconstituted.
Probably, it’s time for Round 2.
Arun Shankar former executive editor Dataquest
Next Page : Events That Lead to TRAI’s Revision of Basic Telecom Tariffs...
Page(s) 1 2